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The Promise and Challenge of Humanitarian
Protection in the United States: Making Temporary
Protected Status Work as a Safe Haven
Andrew I. Schoenholtz*
ABSTRACT
The humanitarian program Congress created in 1990 to allow war refugees and those
affected by significant natural disasters to live and work legally in the United States has only
partially achieved its goals. More than 400,000 individuals have received temporary protected
status (TPS). In many cases, the crisis ended, along with temporary protection. However, in about
half of the designated nationalities—including the largest groups—conflict and instability
continued, making this humanitarian protection program anything but temporary. Unfortunately,
Congress did not provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the tools it needed to
address such long-term crises. That was purposeful—Congress worried that this temporary
program would lead to permanent immigration. To constrain the program, Congress required a
supermajority of the Senate for any nationality to be granted lawful permanent resident status as
a group, which would place such individuals on a path to citizenship. Congress has never granted
group status in this way to any TPS nationality.
Congress also worried that even temporary legal status for conflict refugees and other
eligible humanitarian groups would act as a magnet and attract large movements to the United
States. For that reason, Congress required that eligible individuals had to already be in the United
States when the DHS Secretary designated their nationality for TPS. Accordingly, Congress
designed TPS in a way that did not protect ongoing arrivals fleeing a humanitarian emergency.
Congress should address both of these shortcomings. This article explains why and how it
should do so. As DHS data shows, TPS has not acted as a magnet—even after DHS has repeatedly
opened up temporary protection for some new arrivals through twenty re-designations of eleven
nationalities. The data shows that it is not the policy that attracts people to the United States, but
rather a fear of death or very serious harm that principally motivates flight from conflict and
significant violence. Accordingly, Congress can provide the same type of temporary protection to
new arrivals fleeing an ongoing crisis that many nations do, including the United Kingdom and
Canada, without worrying that TPS itself will act as a magnet.
Moreover, Congress did not know in 1990 that limiting access to lawful permanent resident
status when a crisis does not end would effectively lead to long-term TPS programs. Over time,
people put down strong roots in their communities through work, family, education, and religious
institutions. Given this limitation in the current law, Congress should adopt ways to keep TPS
temporary both by facilitating return when conflict ends in a reasonable period of time and by
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enabling those who have become part of their American communities to be recognized as such
when violence and instability is prolonged.
TPS policies have not resulted in a significant magnet effect after twenty-six designations
and one hundred twenty-two separate extensions covering twenty-two nationalities. Accordingly,
Congress can act more generously by providing a temporary measure of protection to all those
who flee serious harm or devastation and by transitioning temporary protection to a permanent
status for individuals who cannot return home safely after a reasonable period of time. By enacting
these reforms, lawmakers will enable TPS to achieve its full potential as a robust humanitarian
policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans generally think of the great nineteenth-century Irish migration as economically
motivated and associate those large movements with the famous potato famine. Between 1846 and
1852, approximately 1.1 million Irish died as a result of the famine, and over 1 million fled the
famine for the United States, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain.1 Given the forced nature of this
migration, these Irish immigrants are most accurately characterized as refugees fleeing a
humanitarian disaster exacerbated by British political machinations.2
See CIARÁN Ó. MURCHADHA, THE GREAT FAMINE: IRELAND’S AGONY 1845-1852, 180 (2013).
See CHRISTINE KINEALY, THIS GREAT CALAMITY: THE IRISH FAMINE 1845-52 299, 353, 357–358 (1995)
(1847 “marked a watershed in Famine emigration . . . [which] had increasingly become the last refuge of a
desperate population who believed that their only hope of survival lay outside of Ireland.” The British
government’s “covert agenda and motivation” was “to facilitate various long-desired changes within
Ireland” via “a variety of means, including emigration.” “This was a pervasive and powerful ‘hidden
agenda’. . . To achieve its ultimate aims, the government’s strategy was based on two underlying
principles: that of issuing the minimal amount of relief consistent with political acceptability; and that of
imposing the maximum possible burden on local resources in order to force a restructuring of Irish
agriculture.”); JENNY EDKINS, WHOSE HUNGER? CONCEPTS OF FAMINE, PRACTICES OF AID 81 (2000)
(“The covert [British] agenda included population control and the consolidation of land ownership and
property. This was achieved when many people emigrated, smallholdings were eliminated, and large
1
2

2
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Fortunately for the Irish, the United States had not yet regulated the admission of
newcomers into various categories and established quotas for different kinds of entry. The modern
immigration system, in contrast, not only limits numbers and types of newcomers (e.g., family
reunification and employment-based immigration), but also draws a line between authorized or
legal immigration and unauthorized or illegal immigration. Were the Irish to come to America’s
shores fleeing famine today, they would be much like the women and children fleeing Central
American violence—in need of humanitarian protection but without legal status to enter. Like the
women and children fleeing Central American violence today, those Irish migrants might be
uncharitably labeled “illegals” too.
Those fleeing such extreme famine or civil conflict are not necessarily escaping persecution,
but they do have a well-founded fear of death or serious harm.3 Today, failing or weak
governments cannot protect many of their citizens from significant violence in various regions of
the world.4 In such dangerous situations, the failure of states to live up to this central responsibility
estates, which had gone bankrupt, sold. The famine was used to bring about social changes that benefited
the ruling classes and consolidated their control.”); David Nally, "That Coming Storm": The Irish Poor
Law, Colonial Biopolitics, and the Great Famine, 98 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 714
(2008) (arguing “that the Great Famine was shaped by a regulatory order willing to exploit catastrophe to
further the aims of population reform,” focusing on the development of the Irish Poor Law system and the
“growing [political] perception that agricultural rationalization, fiscal restructuring, and population
clearances were necessary to ‘ameliorate’ and ‘improve’ Irish society.”); JOHN KELLY, THE GRAVES ARE
WALKING: THE GREAT FAMINE AND THE SAGA OF THE IRISH PEOPLE 3, 26, 254, 335 (2012) (In 1845, the
first signs of the potato blight caused by the fungus Phytophthora infestans became apparent in Ireland and
Western Europe. “In 1846, emigration, though large—116,000 people left Ireland—had had an orderly
character. By the spring of 1847, people were not leaving Ireland; they were fleeing, the way a crowd flees
a burning building: heedlessly, recklessly, with no thought other than to get out. In 1847, 215,000 Irish
sailed to North America, while 150,000 headed to Britain.” “[B]ad luck, a primitive infrastructure, and a
poverty bordering on immiseration can only explain so much of the one-third population loss. British
policy makers also bore much responsibility for what happened. . . What turned a natural disaster into a
human disaster was the determination of senior British officials to use relief policy as an instrument of
nation building in one of the most impoverished parts of the empire.” “The result was a relief program that,
in its particulars, was more concerned with fostering change than with saving lives. Thus, to facilitate
agricultural modernization, London demanded that the inefficient small farmer surrender his two- or threeacre plot in order to qualify for relief; and to promote self-reliance, Parliament passed the Poor Law
Extension Act, which transferred the entire cost of relief to Ireland.”).
3
See SUSAN F. MARTIN, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 244 (2011) (explaining that individuals who flee
generalized violence in the context of a civil war may have a well-founded fear of death, but nonetheless
they do not qualify for protection as refugees under the UN Refugee Convention because they have not
been “specifically targeted”); DENNIS GALLAGHER ET AL., SAFE HAVEN: POLICY RESPONSES TO REFUGEELIKE SITUATIONS 74 (1987) (providing examples of conditions that may produce a “well-founded fear of
injury, deprivation of human rights, and even death” in migrants).
4
See LOTHER BROCK ET AL., FRAGILE STATES: VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION 52–53
(2012) (explaining that frequently the state is the source of threats to the population’s security rather than a
protector due to the security dilemma that is produced by the state’s lack of a legitimate monopoly on
force); Sabine Hassler, Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect, 14 J. INT’L PEACEKEEPING 134, 151
(2010) (enumerating the typical characteristics of a failed state); J.J. MESSNER, FUND FOR PEACE, THE
FRAGILE STATES INDEX 6–7, 11 (2017), https://fragilestatesindex.org/2017/05/14/fsi-2017-factionalizationand-group-grievance-fuel-rise-in-instability/ (ranking 178 countries’ levels of fragility by evaluating twelve
political, social, and economic indicators along with numerous sub-indicators. Based on these indicators,
countries are placed into one of eleven categories in terms of their overall levels of fragility. The eleven
categories range from “Very Sustainable” to “Very High Alert.” The six countries in the “Very High Alert”
category—the most fragile states of 2017—are: Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Central African Republic, Somalia,

3
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results in forced displacement and international migration. So far, American law and policy makers
have responded to such humanitarian crises in a mixed fashion through a rather limited form of
temporary protection.
In 1990, Congress enacted Temporary Protected Status (TPS), balancing two goals that serve
very different purposes.5 First, the TPS statute allowed the federal government to provide a
temporary legal status to nationals from countries where the Secretary of Homeland Security6 finds
the existence of armed conflict, disaster, epidemic, or extraordinary conditions such that
deportation is not safe for the individual or where the foreign state is not currently able to handle
their return. In this way, TPS protects designated nationals from return to countries where they
face significant violence and other serious harm; many such nationals merit protection because
they possess what scholars have called a “well-founded fear of death.”7 As then-Representative
Hamilton Fish Jr. (R-NY) stated on the House Floor regarding a 1989 safe haven bill: “The threat
to human life posed by war or natural disaster can be as great—or even greater—than the risk to
life posed by the threat of persecution.”8
Second, Congress aimed to prevent the grant of temporary legal status from subsequently
encouraging large numbers of foreign nationals to migrate to the United States.9 Unfortunately,
the way Congress and the Executive have resolved the tension between humanitarian protection
and border control has limited the effectiveness of the humanitarian response to children, women,
and men displaced by serious violence that has disrupted their societies.
This Article examines this tension with the aim of developing more robust solutions to the
security needs of the displaced in finding a safe haven in the United States. This study carefully
examines the actual uses of TPS and its predecessors to understand how these policies have
balanced humanitarian protection and border control. The analysis considers whether TPS has
proven to be a magnet attracting significant numbers of new arrivals. The Article also discusses
what it would take to keep TPS temporary and to create such a safe haven for ongoing arrivals
from humanitarian crises. Taking future control of unauthorized immigration and work into
account, this Article proposes ways of ensuring that all those with a well-founded fear of serious
harm are protected. Finally, it posits ways to make TPS truly temporary, both by facilitating return
when conflict and other crises end in a reasonable period of time and by enabling those who have
become part of their American communities to be recognized as such when violence and instability
is protracted.

and South Sudan. The next most fragile states are the nine countries classified as “High Alert.” Of the 178
countries ranked in the index, 124 fall into warning or alert categories, while 54 are classified as “Very
Sustainable,” “Sustainable,” “Very Stable,” “More Stable, or “Stable”).
5
8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(a)(1)(B) (West 2012).
6
In 1990, Congress authorized the Attorney General, who oversaw the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, to designate TPS nationalities. When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security
through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress transferred those powers to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Public Law 107-296, § 102, 116 Stat. 2135, 2141–42 (2002).
7
See Aristide R. Zolberg, et al., Who Is a Refugee? Chapter 1, in ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND
THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989); Dennis Gallagher et al., Temporary Safe Haven:
The Need for North American-European Responses, in REFUGEES & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 333
(Loescher & Monahan eds., 1989).
8
135 CONG. REC. 25,837 (1989).
9
See 136 CONG. REC. 27,131 (1990) (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio) asserting that
arrival cut-off dates would eliminate the risk of a magnet effect).
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I. THE CLASH BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION AND IMMIGRATION CONTROL: THE ORIGINS
OF TPS
Lawmakers constructed TPS out of a dissatisfaction with the ad hoc use of a discretionary
non-deportation policy developed by Attorneys General over a long period of time: Extended
Voluntary Departure (EVD). Based on general statutory authority to enforce the immigration
laws,10 this vehicle enabled the executive branch to stay the removal of different national groups
in the United States, many of whose members did not qualify for asylum as persecuted refugees
but who would not have been safe if they were deported to their home countries due to political
strife and conflict. EVD did not provide these individuals with legal admission or immigration
status—it only provided for a stay of deportation and work authorization if they were already in
the United States.11 To take advantage of EVD, eligible individuals were not required to appear
before Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials unless they desired to obtain a work
permit.12 Though the incentive of a work permit did encourage many eligible individuals to make
themselves known to INS officials, there were also many eligible individuals who did not take
advantage of EVD until threatened with deportation, thus preventing INS from being able to
estimate precisely how many individuals were covered under EVD at any one time.13
From 1960 through 1989, the Attorney General granted blanket EVD to nationals from at
least fourteen different countries: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, Chile,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and
Poland.14 Starting in 1981 and throughout that decade, lawmakers asked the Attorney General to
grant EVD to Salvadorans who had fled the civil war, but no Attorney General did so.15 Not
surprisingly, the members who introduced the TPS provisions based them at least in part on EVD
as a mechanism that protected people from deportation and provided them with work
authorization.16

10

See 8 U.S.C.A § 1103(a)(1) (West 1952).
Legal immigration status enables a non-citizen to remain in the United States as long as that status is
valid. It is a more secure form of a permission to live in the country as compared to a “stay of deportation”
or “a stay of removal,” which can be lifted at any time. EVD did not change the unauthorized immigration
status of its beneficiaries, and under current laws, unauthorized status can restrict those who become
eligible for a legal immigration status from obtaining one.
12
GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 19.
13
See id.
14
See Peter C. Diamond, Comment, Temporary Protected Status Under the Immigration Act of 1990, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 857, 864 (1992); Lynda J. Oswald, Note, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting
the Attorney General’s Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152, 158–59 (1986);
Memorandum from Andorra Bruno et al., Cong. Research Serv., to Multiple Congressional Requesters 20–
23 (July 13, 2012), https://edsource.org/wp-content/uploads/old/Deferred-Action-Congressional-ResearchService-Report1.pdf.
15
Diamond, supra note 14; see also SERGIO AGUAYO & PATRICIA WEISS FAGAN, CENTRAL AMERICANS IN
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 40–42 (1988) (listing arguments by State and Justice Department
officials opposing a grant of safe haven for Central Americans in the United States).
16
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-627, at 4-8 (1988) (explaining that the purpose of the Temporary Safe Haven Act
of 1988 was to provide a formal mechanism which would replace EVD and clearly establishing similarities
between the proposed legislation and its predecessor by use of frequent comparisons. The legislators
identified a “continuing and compelling” need to retain a form of “safe haven” protection for individuals
who did not qualify for asylum, but nonetheless were unable to return safely to their home countries due to
unanticipated crises. Though EVD had previously provided protection in analogous situations, the
11
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One additional extra-statutory device used by Attorney Generals was Deferred Enforced
Departure (DED). Alike in function and differing only in name, DED is a variation of EVD, is
granted through presidential memoranda or executive orders, and is based on the power to conduct
foreign relations.17 Like EVD, DED does not grant immigration status to individuals but merely
prevents their removal from the United States and provides the opportunity to apply for
employment authorization.18 DED was first used in 1990 by President Bush, Sr. to provide special
protection to Chinese nationals in the United States in response to the Tiananmen Square
Massacre.19 President Bush created DED because of ongoing litigation regarding EVD that
involved political motivations going back to the Reagan Administration.20 Subsequently,
Presidents have authorized DED for Persian Gulf evacuees (1991), Salvadorans (1992), Haitians
(1997), and Liberians (1999 and 2007).21 Currently, nationals of Liberia are the only group
authorized for DED.22 However, on March 27, 2018, a presidential memorandum was issued
directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to begin a 12-month wind-down period and to take
the necessary measures to officially terminate DED for Liberia on March 31, 2019. 23 President
Trump authorized a 12-month extension of this DED wind-down until March 31, 2020.24
Neither EVD nor DED was codified in law.25 The lack of legal standards concerned many
lawmakers,26 who addressed this by creating such standards through the TPS statute. The 1990
enactment defined the circumstances under which TPS could be designated by the Attorney
General, the process for extending and terminating designations, and the legal status and limited
benefits provided to eligible beneficiaries; additionally, it imposed a supermajority requirement
Committee also identified EVD as inherently flawed and recognized that the Temporary Safe Haven Act of
1988 responded to and redressed these concerns satisfactorily).
17
Adjudicator's Field Manual, § 38.2: Deferred Enforced Departure, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS,
§ 38.2(a) (2014), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-16606/0-0-016764.html#0-0-0-591; see also Congress Steps up Protection for Chinese Students, REFUGEE REPS., 9–10
(July 1989) (quoting INS general counsel, Paul Virtue, who explained that when comparing DED with
EVD, “[t]here is no distinction in practical effect with EVD.” He attributes the name change to the fact that
“EVD was an unfortunate term” because it was confusingly similar to “voluntary departure”).
18
Id. at § 38.2(c).
19
Exec. Order, 55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 13, 1990),
http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/fedreg/fr055/fr055072/fr055072.pdf.
20
Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, 8 J. REFUGEE STUD. 339,
342 (1995); Peter Perl, 2nd Area Church Group Gives Sanctuary to Salvadoran Refugees, WASH. POST (Oct.
11, 1983) (those lobbying for EVD for Salvadorans argued that the decision not to grant was that the
Reagan Administration supported the right-leaning Salvadoran government).
21
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE GRANTS OF TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION RELIEF, 1956-PRESENT 7– 9
(Oct. 2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/executive_grants_of_temporary_i
mmigration_relief_1956-present_final_0.pdf.
22
See Deferred Enforced Departure, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERVS,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/deferred-enforced-departure.
23
Memorandum on Expiration of Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800196/pdf/DCPD-201800196.pdf.
24
84 Fed. Reg. 13,059, 13,059–64 (Apr. 3, 2019).
25
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-627, at 7 (explaining that while there is no explicit statutory basis for EVD, the
authority to extend EVD is based on Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
26
See id. at 8 (outlining the concerns of the Committee on the Judiciary regarding deficiencies in the EVD
program and identifying as a flaw of the program the absence of regulation that specifically defines the
“conditions under which safe haven may be granted”).
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for a group’s adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence (LPR) and limited eligibility to
those already present in the United States at the time of designation.27
The EVD and DED frameworks adopted by the TPS legislation provided temporary safety
only to those already present in the United States. TPS does not protect individuals fleeing ongoing
humanitarian emergencies if they arrive in the United States after the Attorney General (now the
Secretary of Homeland Security) establishes the program for a particular nationality.28 Neither
DED or EVD had generally been available to members of those nationalities seeking admission to
the United States; similarly, the TPS provisions explicitly provide that TPS is not available to those
seeking admission only for the purpose of gaining TPS.29 Since none of these policies have applied
to individuals fleeing an ongoing crisis, protection is only partial.30
The TPS legislation specifies just which country condition circumstances merit designation
and protection. Section 244(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets out three possible
findings that the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security may use as the basis of a
TPS designation or re-designation:
(A) the Attorney General finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the
state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of
that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose a serious threat to their
personal safety;
(B) the Attorney General finds that(i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental
disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living
conditions in the area affected,
(ii) the foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the
state of aliens who are nationals of the state, and
(iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation under this subparagraph;
or

27

8 U.S.C.A § 1254a (West 2012).
Id. at § 1254a(c)(1)(A).
29
Id. at § 1254a(c)(5).
30
The United States generally restricted EVD to nationals of the designated country who were present in
the United States prior to a particular cut-off date. See Update on EVD, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES
964, 965 (1988) (explaining that entry cut-off dates were intended by the INS to combat the pull of a
magnet effect and listing entry cut-off dates for Poland, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia); see, e.g., INS
Implements Instructions on Deportation to Poland, 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 85–86 (1982) (initial entry
cut-off date for Polish EVD recipients was December 23, 1981); INS Issues Instructions on Extended
Voluntary Departure for Ethiopians, INTERPRETER RELEASES 456, 456–57 (1982) (updating entry cut-off
date for Ethiopian EVD recipients). It appears that on at least one occasion, INS may not have established
an arrival cut-off date when designating EVD. See Update on EVD, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 965 (1988)
(explaining that EVD for Ugandans was announced on June 8, 1978 and expired September 30, 1986, but
never had an entry cut-off date); see, e.g., Deferred Departure for Ugandans Extended to October 31,
1984, 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 330, 330 (1984) (providing text of INS Assistant Commissioner’s cable
to field offices regarding extension of Ugandan EVD. Uganda may not be the only such reported exception,
but designations of EVD were not published in the Federal Register and sometimes originated in INS
cables from the Central Office. Not all designations have been found in Interpreter Releases or elsewhere).
28
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(C) the Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary and temporary
conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from
returning to the state in safety, unless the Attorney General finds that permitting the
aliens to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest
of the United States.31
When Congress enacted TPS, civil wars in Central America dominated their focus.
Supporters of the statute pointed to a long history, that dated back to President Eisenhower’s
administration, of providing a temporary haven to individuals until it was safe to return or be
deported. In recommending passage of the “Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1988” as amended to
the whole House, the House Judiciary Committee reported that Republican and Democratic
Administrations had provided temporary safety to nationals of thirteen countries who could not
show that they were persecuted refugees:
Recognizing that in some circumstances an individual who cannot show
persecution may nonetheless be subjected to great danger if forced to returned
home, every Administration since and including that of President Eisenhower has
permitted one or more groups of otherwise deportable aliens to remain temporarily
in the United States out of concern that the forced repatriation of these individuals
could endanger their lives or safety. Since 1960, this deferral of deportation, which
has come to be known as "Extended Voluntary Departure" (or "EVD"), has been
exercised for the benefit of aliens from 13 different nations.32
During final consideration of the TPS provisions on October 2, 1990, Rep. Jack Brooks (DTex.) summed up the purpose of temporary safe haven on the House Floor this way: “Individuals
who have fled from El Salvador, Liberia, Lebanon, and Kuwait should not be required to return to
their war-torn homelands until the political situation in those countries is stabilized.”33
Opponents of the statute focused on the immigration-control aspect of the proposed law and
referred to it as offering temporary safe haven to “illegals” from El Salvador, Lebanon, Liberia
and Kuwait. For example, as Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) said on the House Floor in October
1990, “[The temporary safe haven provisions] keep lots of illegals here indiscriminately for
extended periods of time.”34 The previous year, Rep. McCollum argued on the House Floor that
“by and large the Salvadorans who are in this country are here for economic reasons.”35 Referring
to temporary safe haven as an amnesty, Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Tex.) said on the House Floor during
final deliberations of the TPS provisions:
What we are dealing with here is just another amnesty program for another specific
country. We seem to be piling on more special interest legislation on top of more
special interest legislation tonight. Mr. Chairman, this is a situation where we have
amnesty now provided for the third time just passed in H.R. 4300. Amnesty is not
the right way to determine our immigration policy. Amnesty is not the right way to
31

8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(b)(1).
H.R. REP. NO. 100-627, at 6.
33
136 CONG. REC. 27,129 (1990).
34
Id.
35
135 CONG. REC. 25,831 (1989).
32
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be fair to those who have been law abiding, and we should not reward lawbreakers
to the detriment of the law abiders.36
Rep. McCollum tried to persuade his colleagues to vote against temporary safe haven by
arguing that the then-existing asylum laws for persecuted refugees were sufficient and that it made
no sense to grant asylum when conditions can change quickly. During final consideration of the
TPS provisions on the House Floor in October 1990, he argued that the bill would grant:
amnesty to a bunch of illegals who are here from four for [sic] five countries and
picking them out [sic] for 3 years. I am not telling you these are bad people, but I
am telling you that if they are in fear and you want to protect them because they are
in fear of getting persecuted if they go back to their native countries, that you are
talking about laws already on the books designed to protect that. Instead what you
are going to do is lock the hands of the administration and say absolutely under no
conditions for 3 years are you going to let these people go. As I said earlier, last
year when this was out here on the floor for debate, China and Nicaragua were
included. Conditions have changed in less than a year. They are not included this
time. Suppose things change in these countries in less than a year. This is not good
public policy. This is bad public policy. We need to let the existing laws work. They
do work, and we have absolutely no business going forward with the kind of
proposal that is in the bill today, to lock in 3 years of amnesty for four special
countries for all the illegals who are here and not do that same thing for everybody.
It is ridiculous. It is absurd.37
Rep. William H. Gray III (D-Pa.) responded by characterizing the intended beneficiaries
as refugees fleeing war:
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McCollum amendment. Should this
amendment pass, some 14,000 nonimmigrant Liberians would face the threat of
detention and deportation to a country where there is no water, there is no
electricity, there is no government and practically no hope. Mr. Chairman, some
5,000 Liberian civilians have lost their lives in recent months as a result of the
anarchy that has descended upon their country. There is a three-sided civil war
there. In addition, tens of thousands have been displaced and hundreds of thousands
have had to flee to neighboring countries. The promises of the Department of
Immigration and Naturalization Services to provide safe haven to the 14,000
Liberians stranded in this country have not borne fruit. As a result, there are now
as many INS policy responses to Liberians as there are INS offices. The promised
36

136 CONG. REC. 27,129. Some members today continue to view TPS through the lens of amnesty. For
example, Reps. Steve King (R-Iowa), Louie Gohmert (R-Tex.) and Michael McCaul (R-Tex.), Rep. Mo
Brooks (R-Ala.) introduced the TPS Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 2604, 115th Congress § 1 (May 23, 2017),
which would make unauthorized immigrants ineligible for TPS. “This legislation provides the needed
reform for what has become a long-running amnesty program.” Press Release, Congressman Mo Brooks,
Brooks Introduces Legislation to Reform TPS Program (May 24, 2017), https://brooks.house.gov/mediacenter/news-releases/brooks-introduces-legislation-reform-tps-program.
37
136 CONG. REC. 27,129.
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safe-haven status provided by the July 27 INS policy memo has not been
implemented. What is needed now is the force of law to protect these people. They
need to be removed from the whim of procedural discretion and administration
lethargy. This is a matter of human compassion. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues,
we are not asking that these people be given permanent resident status in this
country. We are not asking that they be allowed to live indefinitely in this country.
We are simply asking that they be spared detention and deportation until the war in
their land subsides. No one knows how long that will be. But the Moakley
amendment provides a 3-year grace period in this bill.38
Rep. Gray ultimately focused this House Floor debate with Rep. McCollum on the fact that
only refugees fleeing targeted persecution are eligible for asylum but that refugees fleeing war also
deserve to remain safely in the United States:
Mr. Chairman, asylum is not always fairly administered. There have been numerous
examples of how it has been unfairly administered to Salvadorans and others.
Second, not everyone who needs protection meets the strict standard of asylum
which is "well-founded fear of persecution." In the case of Liberians, we are not
talking about a well-founded fear of persecution which is the direct text of the law;
we are talking about going back to a country where there is a three-sided civil war.
People are being butchered. So therefore the asylum method that the gentleman
talks about really does not apply to many of these people.39
In response, Rep. McCollum asserted that refugees fleeing war were already protected under
asylum law: “If there is no well-founded fear of persecution, then maybe they ought to go back. If
they are having a three-sided civil war over there, there is a well-founded fear of persecution.”40
As a matter of law, war refugees who are persecuted on account of a protected characteristic, such
as political opinion or ethnicity, are eligible for asylum, but those who are simply trying to flee
fighting are not. The latter often constitute the majority of those displaced in civil wars. Whether
or not Rep. McCollum understood this distinction or simply opposed any expansion of
humanitarian protection is not clear from this debate. Rep. Bruce Morrison (D-Conn.) explained
this gap in law:
The gentleman from Florida suggests that we have rules to deal with these
problems. We do not. We do not have a set of rules to deal with just what the
gentleman from Pennsylvania said, not individualized persecution but warfare or
famine or some other form of pestilence or violence in the country. This provision
not only specifies four countries to be protected but establishes a standard rule to
be applied in future cases in other countries.41
Had the Attorney General exercised his discretion in the 1980s to apply EVD to additional
countries, such as El Salvador, Liberia, Lebanon, and Kuwait, Congress might not have enacted
38

Id. at 27,130.
Id. (statement of Rep. Gray).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 27,131.
39
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TPS.42 However, many members of Congress believed that legal standards set by statute would
ensure a more consistent application of this non-deportation protection. For example, Rep. Mary
Rose Oakar (D-Ohio) explained how a temporary safe haven law would address the ad hoc nature
of extended voluntary departure, particularly in its implementation: “An orderly, systematic
procedure for providing temporary protected status for nationals of countries undergoing war, civil
war, or other extreme tragedy is needed to replace the current ad hoc haphazard procedure. The
current procedure for extended voluntary departure is so arbitrary and discretionary that aliens are
reluctant to come forward.”43
Rep. Oakar went on to explain that she and twelve other members of Congress asked the
Attorney General to grant Extended Voluntary Departure to Lebanese nationals but were told that
doing so “would set a bad precedent for people from other strife-torn countries.”44 She concluded
42

As early as 1981, members of Congress, including Sen. Edward Kennedy, called on the Attorney General
to grant EVD to Salvadorans. GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 38-39. This policy paper discusses the
political controversies over EVD for Salvadorans who fled the civil war. Id. at 33–44. Congressional
pressure continued during the decade. Based on their deep concern regarding human rights violations and
violence in El Salvador and dissatisfaction over the Reagan Administration rejection of EVD for
Salvadorans, Rep. Moakley and Sen. DeConcini introduced safe haven legislation for Salvadorans in 1984.
Id. at 40. When Salvadoran President Duarte asked President Reagan to grant EVD to Salvadorans in 1987,
Rep. Moakley called on the President to do so via a House Floor statement. 133 CONG. REC. 9800 (1987).
Due to the Reagan and Bush Administrations’ disagreements with the Congressional members who
supported safe haven for Salvadorans, the TPS legislation explicitly granted TPS to Salvadorans in 1990.
Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 303, 104 Stat. 5035 (Nov. 29, 1990).
43
Id. at 27,130. Rep. Oakar reported the problems faced by Lebanese nationals in this regard. “In
the case of the Lebanese, this fear is compounded by the fact that Lebanese nationals in many
areas of the country are placed into deportation hearings once they apply for extended voluntary
departure or deferred departure. These are the same Lebanese nationals whose cases are supposed
to be viewed sympathetically by the Immigration and Naturalization Service because of an INS
directive last October to that effect. I ask unanimous consent that the telex be entered into the
RECORD.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, Washington, DC, October 12, 1989. While
there is still no blanket policy to grant deferred departure to nationals of Lebanon in the United
States who have overstayed, the civil strife in Lebanon continues. This is to reaffirm that officers
should, on a case-by-case basis, view sympathetically requests for deferred departure where such
requests are based upon compelling humanitarian need. This is a lesser standard than a fear of
persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion.
One-third of the population of Lebanon is displaced (one million people) and 15 percent have
suffered casualties. The United States Government recently withdrew Embassy personnel from
Lebanon, the first time an American presence has been absent since World War II. A travel ban
for American passport holders has been in effect for three years. The cease-fire called on
September 23, 1989, has already been breached. However, there are some places of relative safety
within Lebanon. These circumstances should be kept in mind when assessing individual requests
for deferred departure from Lebanese nationals. GERALD L. COYLE, Acting Commissioner.
Some immigration lawyers have told me that the Extended Voluntary Departure Program is administered
so badly that [there are officials] . . . at the INS, ranging from people in docketing to a regional INS
Director, who had not heard of the October INS directive to treat Lebanese applications for extended
voluntary departure sympathetically and who had no idea which department within the regional INS Office
would handle such a request. This problem is not confined to one office. I have heard this complaint from
attorneys from many different areas of the country. As a result, immigration lawyers are reluctant to advise
Lebanese nationals to apply for extended voluntary departure, because they have no assurance that their
clients will be treated sympathetically.” Id. at 27,130–27,131.
44
Id. at 27,131.
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that “[b]ecause the Justice Department is opposed to helping these people, the only solution is
legislative.”45
But perhaps the most contested issue Congress debated involved concerns of some members
that granting temporary safe haven would act as a magnet to attract unqualified individuals who
might not otherwise have been inclined to immigrate to the United States and would also result in
increased numbers of unauthorized entrants.46 According to this perspective, such individuals
would use this safe haven provision as a vehicle for economic advancement rather than to fulfill
its humanitarian intent.47 The Bush Administration also feared that grants of temporary protection
would establish precedent which would encourage people from other countries in similar
circumstances to expect comparable treatment.48
In contrast, Rep. Oakar argued that temporary safe haven “would not act as a magnet,
because it is designed only for those people who are here now. Our Nation should act humanely
toward those who are stranded at our doorstep. We cannot, in good conscience, send these people
home to face their death.”49
The author of the safe haven provisions, Rep. Joe Moakley (D-Mass.), focused on the deadly
civil war in El Salvador, which “is the size of my State of Massachusetts. Over 70,000 civilians
have been killed in the last decade. It is only human that people who live in fear will flee, seeking
safety for their children and families. How can we deny their human needs and our moral
obligations?”50
Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), who worked alongside Rep. Moakley for nearly a decade
to obtain safe haven for Salvadorans, emphasized that the United States had a humanitarian
responsibility towards those who fled civil war in El Salvador because of the United States’ own
role in the conflict. In support of TPS, he stated, “I do not believe that we should return these
individuals to a country immersed in a civil war in which we are actively involved.”51
Rep. Moakley addressed the various objections to TPS:

45

Id.
See Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 24 (1987) [hereinafter Temporary Safe Haven
Hearing] (statement of Delia Combs, Assistant INS Commissioner) (expressing the incumbent
Administration’s belief that enacting temporary safe haven legislation will “encourage unqualified aliens
who entered subsequent to the qualifying date to engage in fraud in order to establish eligibility for the
relief”).
47
See id. (explaining the fear that the proposed legislation would encourage economic migrants from
Central America and other regions); Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General to the House of
Representatives (July 19, 1983), reprinted in Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens:
Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 84-86 (1984) (expressing fear that granting EVD to El Salvador would
encourage migration of other “illegal immigrants” and would produce greater competition for social
services and in the employment market). See, e.g., Recent Activity on Relief Bills for Salvadorans and
Nicaraguans, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 795-96 (1987) (Sen. Simpson expressed concern that El
Salvador President Duarte’s 1987 request for an EVD extension was inappropriately based on “economic
hardship factors,” and had already prompted similar requests by the Dominican Republic and Guatemala).
48
See Alice Jackson Smith, Note, Temporary Safe Haven for De Facto Refugees from War, Violence and
Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 524–25 (1988).
49
136 CONG. REC. 27,131 (1990).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 35,611.
46
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The opponents of this measure argue like chicken little, that the sky is falling, and
that if we enact this measure America will be overrun by people who somehow
pose a threat to our well-being. This is ludicrous and inhumane. By its specific
terms, only people already here today are entitled to temporary protected status.
And these are good people, decent people, law-abiding people who are committed
to the safety of their families. By its terms, this measure denies protection to anyone
convicted of criminal activity, or who would be inadmissible to the United States
under our immigration laws. By its terms, this measure provides no Federal benefits
to those it protects. By its terms, this measure requires those who are covered to
register with the proper authorities. In addition, this measure establishes a statutory
framework for future uses of safe haven protection. It ends the current ad hoc
approach to dealing with people in need.52
By a vote of 285 to 131 with 17 abstentions, the supporters of temporary safe haven
provisions defeated the amendment proposed by Rep. McCollum.53
Beyond the policy’s humanitarian roots, some lawmakers emphasized another goal of this
statutory form of relief. Sen. DeConcini argued that TPS creates a “registration system” that could
“facilitate the return of Salvadorans when the period of temporary protection status expires.”54
This important point was consistently raised in discussions surrounding safe haven legislation. In
a hearing on the Temporary Safe Haven Act of 1987, for example, a precursor to what would later
become TPS, both Doris Meissner, future Commissioner of the INS from 1993 until 2000, and
Rep. Fish (R-NY) viewed an effective safe haven registration system as an improvement on
EVD.55 That TPS would provide a way to track beneficiaries is significant because there was “no
systematic enumeration or tracking of EVD recipients” prior to this and consequently, there was
no reliable way to locate individuals once temporary protection expired.56 In this way, legislators
established TPS as a humanitarian provision with the goal of facilitating return and enforcement
of the immigration laws when temporary protection was no longer needed.
II. THE PERCEPTION AND REALITY OF MAGNET EFFECTS
Given lawmakers’ concerns, this analysis begins by considering the two most promising
approaches that might reveal whether TPS acts as a magnet: (1) TPS enrollment following redesignations, and (2) border inadmissibility determinations and apprehensions following
designations, extensions, and re-designations of TPS nationalities.
To address the concern that TPS would create a magnet effect resulting in greater crossborder movements, Congress limited granting TPS to those in the United States at the time when
a DHS Secretary establishes the designation for a particular country.57 In cases where a Secretary
extends the designation, the extension only covers those who were in the United States before the
52

Id. at 27,132.
Id. at 27,132–33.
54
Id. at 35,611.
55
Temporary Safe Haven Hearing, supra note 46, at 36, 155 (1987).
56
Id. at 36.
57
See Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 20, at 344 (1995) (hypothesizing that “the cut-off dates and
registration deadlines eliminate any potential ‘magnet effect’ that would draw people to the United States
because of the availability of TPS”).
53

13

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

initial cut-off date.58 Since the designation cut-off date defines eligibility, Secretaries are limited
in their ability to provide TPS to continuing arrivals from on-going humanitarian emergency. At
most, Secretaries can advance the eligibility cut-off date through re-designation.59 This mechanism
does allow those who enter the United States after an initial designation and before a re-designation
to register for TPS, even though it does not address ongoing humanitarian arrivals that occur
following re-designation.60 Secretaries have re-designated eleven of the twenty-two countries
(including one province) since the statute became effective in 1990: Angola, Burundi, Haiti,
Kosovo Province, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.61 To
date, Secretaries have re-designated countries twenty times, some more than once.
A. TPS Enrollment Following Re-Designations
Policymakers concerned about a potential magnet effect thought that the TPS designation
might encourage new arrivals to come to the United States in order to gain this special benefit.62
TPS enrollment following re-designation provides valuable, though imperfect, information about
any such effect on new arrivals. Enrollment following re-designation is open to three groups. Redesignation enables those who arrived after the initial designation but before the new cut-off date
to enroll in TPS. Those who arrived before the initial designation and registered then, of course,
may enroll again as long as they continue otherwise to be eligible for TPS. Finally, those who
arrived before the initial designation and could have, but did not, register for TPS at that time, may
register for the first time during the re-designation enrollment period.63 The publicly available
government data does not separate out these three groups, which would enable the identification
of only those who arrived after the initial designation and before the re-designation.
While this metric is not perfect, the analysis still reveals what happened in terms of
additional registrations during the re-designation period. Table 1 provides DHS estimates of TPS
beneficiaries following the re-designations. In the cases of Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,

The statute requires continuous physical presence “since the effective date of the most recent designation
of that state.” 8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i). The statute refers to an “initial period of designation” and an
“extended period of designation,” making it clear that only those who can demonstrate continuous physical
presence since the initial designation are eligible for TPS. 8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
59
The statute authorizes broad authority to designate as long as country conditions findings are made
warranting such designation and explicitly refers to eligibility based on “the most recent designation.” 8
U.S.C.A § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i).
60
The statute provides for registration in connection with “the most recent designation.” 8 U.S.C.A §
1254a(c)(1)(A)(i).
61
In addition, three of the twenty-two countries—El Salvador, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—were
designated more than once after termination of the initial designation. See Table 3: Duration of TPS
Table, infra p 24; Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (TPS notices
for each country); Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 18, 2019)
(information available under “Countries Currently Designated for TPS” and “Countries Previously
Designated for TPS”).
62
See notes 46 and 47 and accompanying text.
63
All three groups may be able to demonstrate continuous physical presence since “the effective date of the
most recent designation.” 8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i).
58
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and Syria, re-designations occurred more than once.64 The estimated number of beneficiaries is
reported after DHS takes its next action to extend, re-designate, or terminate TPS.
As Table 1 below shows, four TPS nationalities decreased in size following re-designation:
Angola, Kosovo Province, Somalia, and Sudan (three times). Except in the case of Haiti, which is
fully discussed below, the increases following a re-designation among the other nationalities set
out in Table 1 below ranged from ten (South Sudan) to 3,000 (Liberia). The difficulty of reaching
the United States means that African and Middle Eastern refugees largely remain in their region
or at most try to reach Europe. For example, as DHS Secretary Nielsen reported in the 2018
extension of TPS for Syrians: “After nearly seven years of armed conflict, over half of Syria’s prewar population has been forced to flee from their homes. There are 11.5 million displaced Syrians
in the region, both inside Syria and in neighboring countries.”65 Simply looking at the Table 1
numbers of nationals who registered following re-designation for TPS makes it clear that neither
the original designations nor the re-designations attracted a sizeable flow of refugees from these
countries. An estimated 2,600 Syrians, for example, registered initially in 2012; some 5,000 after
the first re-designation, around 5,800 following the second, and about 7,000 registered after the
third re-designation in 2016.66 Thus with regards to the re-designations of these ten countries or
provinces, including multiple re-designations of Liberia (three), Somalia (two), South Sudan
(three), Sudan (three), and Syria (three), policymakers’ concerns that TPS has any potential magnet
effect for these nationals is unsubstantiated by any empirical evidence.

See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protectedstatus (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (TPS notices for each country Temporary Protected Status);
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protectedstatus (last updated Nov. 18, 2019); see Table 3: Duration of TPS Table, infra p. 24.
65
83 Fed. Reg. 9329, 9331 (Mar. 5, 2018).
66
Id. at 9330.
64
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Table 1: DHS Estimates of TPS Beneficiaries for Re-designated States67
Initial Designation
Angola
3,372
Burundi
400
Haiti
47,000
Kosovo Province
5,000
Liberia I
5,000
Liberia II
2,400
Sierra Leone
4,000
Somalia
2,000
South Sudan
<10
Sudan
4,000
Syria
2,600
Yemen
1,000
*No subsequent re-designations

Re-designation

2nd Re-designation

3rd Re-designation

1,00068
1,00069
60,000
1,00070
8,000
3,79272
5,00073
250
<20
1,500
5,000
1,250

N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
10,00071
N/A*
N/A*
270
50
648
5,800
N/A*

N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
N/A*
70
60074
7,000
N/A*

Compiled using information from Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (using the TPS
notices for each country) and U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 18, 2019). As
the round numbers suggest and the notices generally state, these are estimates. See, e.g., Extension of the
Designation of Sierra Leone Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,405, 67,407
(Nov. 9, 2000) (The Attorney General states: “I estimate that there are approximately 5,000 nationals of
Sierra Leone (or aliens who have no nationality and who last habitually resided in Sierra Leone) who have
been granted TPS and who are eligible for reregistration.” Moreover, the author has learned from
discussions with DHS officials that with respect to termination notices, the estimates actually represent all
individuals who have received TPS following the initial designation and subsequent re-designations unless
that status was withdrawn by DHS. Finally, the government reports these estimates in the extension or
termination notice that follows the relevant designation or re-designation notice).
68
In the Termination Notice for Angola, the Attorney General estimated that only 316 Angolans received
TPS benefits in 2003. Termination of Designation of Angola Under the Temporary Protected Status
Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 3896, 3897 (Jan. 27, 2003).
69
In the Termination Notice for Burundi, the DHS Secretary estimated that only 30 Burundians had been
granted TPS as of 2007. Termination of the Designation of Burundi for Temporary Protected Status, 72
Fed. Reg. 61,172, 61,174 (Oct. 29, 2007).
70
In the Termination Notice for Kosovo Province, the Attorney General estimated that no more than 1,000
Kosovars had been granted TPS as of 2003. Termination of Designation of the Province of Kosovo in the
Republic of Serbia in the State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) Under the
Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,356–57 (Jan. 27, 2003).
71
In the 2006 Termination Notice for Liberia, the DHS Secretary estimated that about 3,600 Liberians had
been granted TPS at that point in time. Termination of the Designation of Liberia for Temporary Protected
Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,000, 55,004 (Sept. 20, 2006).
72
In the 2016 Termination Notice for Liberia, the DHS Secretary estimated that about 2,160 Liberians
received TPS benefits at that point in time. Six-Month Extension of Temporary Protected Status Benefits for
Orderly Transition Before Termination of Liberia’s Designation for Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed.
Reg. 66,059, 66,061 (Sept. 26, 2016).
73
In the Termination Notice for Sierra Leone, the DHS Secretary estimated that about 3,700 Sierra
Leoneans received TPS benefits as of 2003. Termination of the Designation of Sierra Leone for Temporary
Protected Status, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,407, 52,410 (Sept. 3, 2003).
74
DHS estimates some 1,040 Sudanese TPS beneficiaries in the 2017 Termination Notice. Termination of
the Designation of Sudan for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,228, 47,230 (Oct. 11, 2017).
67
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Policymakers view nationals of Haiti as more susceptible to a magnet effect because of the
proximity of that country and the long history of Haitian immigration to the United States,
including significant legal immigration.75
The TPS registration numbers are useful in assessing whether the 2010 TPS designation76 or
the subsequent 2011 re-designation attracted additional Haitians to the United States. We first
examine the registration numbers. Table 2 includes DHS estimates of Haitian TPS beneficiaries
identified at the time of the re-designation in 2011, as well as the extensions in 2012, 2014, 2015,
and 2017:
Table 2: Haitian TPS Beneficiaries
Date of Re-Designation and Extension
May 19, 2011
Oct. 12, 2012
March 3, 2014
Aug. 25, 2015
May 24, 2017

Number of Haitian Beneficiaries
47,000
60,000
51,000
50,000
46,000

The initial TPS designation for Haiti was made a mere eight days after the January 2010
earthquake that killed approximately 230,000 people, affected three million people, and
significantly destroyed infrastructure across the island nation.77 When the initial 18-month
designation was made, the devastating effects of the earthquake were evident but it was unclear
how long Haiti would remain in a state of crisis. As reported in the May 2011 re-designation, some
47,000 Haitians had successfully registered for TPS in 2010.78 According to that re-designation,
UNICEF reported that 1.6 million Haitians, including 800,000 children, were displaced from their
homes.79 In addition, severe cholera outbreaks, including about 200,000 known cases, threatened
to spread nationwide.80 With these dire conditions, the Secretary of DHS re-designated Haiti to
enable individuals who were lawfully admitted to the United States after the earthquake through
humanitarian parole or temporary visas to register for and remain legally under TPS.81 In fact,
DHS gave special permission to orphaned children to enter the United States following the
earthquake by using humanitarian parole, a discretionary authority for urgent humanitarian
emergencies under INA Sec. 212(d)(5).82
75

According to the Migration Policy Institute, over 675,000 Haitian immigrants lived in the United States
in 2015. Jennifer Schulz and Jeanne Batalova, Haitian Immigrants in the United States (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/haitian-immigrants-united-states.
76
See Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,476 (Jan. 21, 2010).
77
Extension and Re-designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000–01 (May
19, 2011).
78
Id. at 29,002.
79
Id. at 29,001.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 29,002; See also Secretary Napolitano Announces the Extension of Temporary Protected Status for
Haiti Beneficiaries, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (May 17, 2011),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/17/secretary-napolitano-announces-extension-temporary-protectedstatus-haiti (“Many of these individuals were authorized to enter the United States immediately after the
earthquake on temporary visas, humanitarian parole and through other immigration measures.”).
82
Secretary Napolitano Announces Humanitarian Parole Policy for Certain Haitian Orphans, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 18, 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/01/18/secretary-announces-
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Following this re-designation, approximately 13,000 additional individuals present in the
United States by or before January 12, 2011 registered for TPS, for a total of 60,000 TPS
beneficiaries.83 This number includes three groups: those among the 47,000 Haitians who
registered after the initial 2010 designation; those who met the continuous residence requirement
and could have but did not register in 2010 but chose to do so after the re-designation; and those,
like the orphaned children, who arrived following the initial designation but before the new cutoff date established by the re-designation. Without a detailed breakdown of this DHS data, we
cannot know for sure how many of the 60,000 were new registrants who had arrived lawfully
during the first year following the earthquake—the intended beneficiaries of the re-designation
according to the DHS Secretary. The number of legal Haitian admissions at that time certainly
shows that most if not all of the 13,000 additional registrants could have been the orphans and
others allowed to enter the United States lawfully.84 It remains a possibility, of course, that some
of the new registrants may have already been in the United States when Haiti was initially
designated in 2010, but did not register for TPS for good cause85 or for other reasons such as cost,
fear of providing DHS with information that could facilitate deportation, or an inability to take
time off from work to apply for the status.86
humanitarian-parole-policy-certain-haitian-orphans. On humanitarian parole, see U.S. CITIZEN & IMMIGR.
SERVS., Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United States,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-or-significant-public-benefit-parole-individuals-outsideunited-states. Haitians with visitor or other non-immigrant visas also entered the United States following
the earthquake and before the advanced cut-off date of the re-designation. See Secretary Napolitano
Announces the Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Haiti Beneficiaries, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC. (May 17, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/17/secretary-napolitano-announces-extensiontemporary-protected-status-haiti; Extension and Re-designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76
Fed. Reg. 29,000, 29,002 (May 19, 2011).
83
See Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed. Reg. 59,943,
59,945 (Oct. 1, 2012).
84
While admissions track events rather than individuals, the number of admissions is so significantly
larger than the 13,000 new TPS enrollees that it could easily account for the size of the higher number
of registrants, at least those who entered on non-immigrant visas. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, 2012 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 68 (2013),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2012.pdf
(showing 99,161 and 98,865 Haitian non-immigrant admissions for FY 2011 and FY 2012,
respectively).
85
8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f)(2) (2018) (identifying several groups, including those who had legal non-immigrant
status at the time of the initial designation, who may file their initial applications following a subsequent
extension). The regulation sets out four different types of “good causes,” including, for example, that the
TPS applicant is a “nonimmigrant or has been granted voluntary departure status or any relief from
removal.” “Good cause” in this case is used as a general term of art. The terminology is not found in the
regulation, but its general meaning is applicable here.
86
See Designations of Temporary Protected Status and Fraud in Prior Amnesty Programs: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 13 (1999)
(statement of Paul Virtue, INS Gen. Counsel) (“by applying for TPS, many applicants were identifying
themselves to INS as being [people who were unlawfully present in the United States], so once the TPS
period expires . . . they could be targeted for removal.”); CECILIA MENJÍVAR, FRAGMENTED TIES:
SALVADORAN IMMIGRANT NETWORKS IN AMERICA 88−89 (2000) (explaining that some Salvadoran
immigrants distrusted TPS legislation because they believed it was intentionally designed with the
purpose of eliciting information that would later be provided to immigration enforcement); Frelick &
Kohnen, supra note 20, at 349 (1995) (suggesting that fear of deportation following TPS termination is
the greatest disincentive for eligible applicants).
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In any event, the total number of Haitians who registered declined to 51,000 as of 201487
and then to 50,000 as of 2015.88 By May 2017, DHS reported that only 46,000 Haitians were still
registered for TPS.89 The absence of any significant increase, other than as intended by the redesignation, in the number of Haitians registered for TPS over the course of multiple extensions
and a re-designation demonstrate that these policies did not attract large flows to the United States
clamoring to obtain this legal immigration status.
B. Border Inadmissibility Determinations and Apprehensions: The Case of Haiti
The magnet effect that policymakers believe may result from TPS involves the arrival of
non-citizens who do not have valid visas to enter the United States. Such individuals have two
ways of attempting to enter the country. They can present themselves to border officials at land,
air and sea ports of entry, or they can try to enter without inspection along the border where
officials are not posted. Accordingly, the number of Haitians presenting themselves at ports-ofentry without a valid visa and the number of Haitians apprehended in between the ports-of-entry
constitute two additional metrics that might reveal whether these TPS policies had a magnet
effect.90 Chart 1 sets out the number of Haitians determined to be inadmissible when they presented
themselves at ports-of-entry without a valid visa, including individuals seeking asylum:91
87

Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,808,
11,810 (Mar. 3, 2014).
88
Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,582, 51,584 (Aug.
25, 2015). Among the reasons why the number of TPS beneficiaries declines over time are adjustment to
another legal status, death, ineligibility due to a subsequent event, and return to the home country. See
David North, Leaving TPS Doesn’t Necessarily Mean Going Home, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 4−6 (July
2015), https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/north-TPS.pdf.
89
Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 23,830, 23,831 (May
24, 2017). This was the last report of current TPS beneficiaries from Haiti. The 2018 termination notice did
not provide an estimate of current beneficiaries. Based on discussions with DHS officials, the author has
learned that the 58,500 Haitian beneficiaries reported in the termination notice are an estimate of the
number who had received TPS following the initial designation and subsequent re-designation and never
had that status withdrawn by DHS. That estimate does not reflect the decline in the number of former
beneficiaries who did not re-register because of cost, adjustment to another legal status, death, ineligibility,
return, or other reasons. According to a July 2018 report, only “recently” did USCIS begin to withdraw
TPS status for those who obtained U.S. citizenship. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., I-821
TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT APPROVED INDIVIDUALS WITH A VALID, EMPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENT (A12 OR C19 CLASSIFICATION) BY BENEFICIARY STATE AND COUNTRY OF
CITIZENSHIP AS OF JULY 16, 2018, at 13 n.8 (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/I821_TPS_Current_Approved_Individuals_with_a_Valid_I765_EAD_A12_or_C19_Classification_by_Beneficiary_State_and_Country_of_Citizenship_as_of_July_1
6_2018.pdf; See Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg.
2648, 2649 (Jan. 18, 2018).
90
One other metric that could be somewhat relevant is the number of Haitians interdicted on the high
seas. Until recently, the U.S. Coast Guard shared that information with the public on their website.
Unfortunately, that information is no longer publicly available. Nonetheless, it is clear that large
numbers of Haitians did not try to reach the United States by boat in response to the TPS designation
and re-designations: “The Coast Guard interdicted 1,377 Haitians in FY2010 and 677 in FY2011 as of
May 12, 2011.” RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RES. SERV., RS21349, U.S. IMMIGR. POL’Y ON HAITIAN
MIGRANTS 1 (2011).
91
As the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics explains, three groups constitute most of the inadmissibility
determinations made by U.S. border officials: those with missing, invalid or fraudulent documents; those
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Chart 1: Haitians Determined to Be Inadmissible at Ports of Entry FY 2005-201592
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During the five years before the 2010 initial designation of TPS, the number of Haitian
determined to be inadmissible each year ranged from 940 to 1,267.93 During the following six
years, that number ranged from 968 to 2,959.94 The increase during the year of the earthquake
resulting in a high of 2,959 Haitians included all of fiscal year FY 2010 (October 1, 2009September 30, 2010), and a good portion may have arrived following the TPS designation in
January 2010. The post-designation part of that FY 2010 increase may well have been
connected to the earthquake or to the TPS designation itself or to both. In other words, some of
these Haitians may have left because of the humanitarian emergency itself. It is possible that
some also left hoping that they would eventually benefit from the TPS policy. There is no way
to disentangle both potential proximate causes. In any case, immediately after the 2011 redesignation, the numbers started going down. In FY 2014 and FY 2015, the number of
inadmissible arrivals returned to pre-earthquake levels.95 The number of Haitian arrivals
determined to be inadmissible in the five years following the TPS designation, then, does not
indicate that TPS policies themselves acted as a magnet in any significant way.
who seek asylum; and crews of foreign vessels. Bryan Baker, Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement
Actions: 2016, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS. 5–7 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf.
92
Baker, supra note 91, at 6 tbl.3.; OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2011
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGR. STATS. 98 tbl.37 (2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2011.pdf.
93
Id.
94
Baker, supra note 91, at 6 tbl.3
95
Id. In FY 2016, the number increased to 6,974, which DHS attributed particularly to Haitians leaving
Brazil in connection with (1) rising unemployment, (2) the outbreak of the Zika virus, and (3) serious
political uncertainties there.
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The best government data available to consider the second metric, Haitians apprehended
in between ports-of-entry, includes all Haitians apprehended by DHS—those arrested in the
interior as well as near the border. Even though the government data found in Chart 2 is not
disaggregated to show only those apprehended as they arrived near the border, it still may
reveal trends.96
Chart 2: Haitians Apprehended Between Ports of Entry and in the Interior FY 2005-201597
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As Chart 2 shows, the number of Haitians apprehended near the border between the portsof-entry as well as in the interior of the United States increased from 999 in FY 2005 to over
2,200 in each of FY 2008 and 2009. When TPS was designated in FY 2010, the apprehensions
declined to below 1,800. In FY 2011 when TPS was re-designated, apprehensions declined
further to below 1,400. The numbers increased in FY 2013, and then declined to 1,124 in FY
96

Whereas border apprehensions generally involve recent arrivals, administrative arrests in the interior
generally involve those who have been in the United States unlawfully as well as those with lawful status
who become subject to removal. Immigration and Customs Enforcement “usually identifies potentially
removable aliens in the interior by working with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to check
the immigration status of people who are arrested or incarcerated, and also conducts operations to detain
certain at-large removable aliens.” Id. at 3. It is worth noting, as this DHS report shows in Table 1, that
Haitians were not among the top ten nationalities apprehended from FY 2010-2015. Id. at 2, 4 tbl.1.
97
OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 93 tbl.34 (2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2011.pdf; OFF. OF
IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2015 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 93
tbl.34 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2015.pdf.
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2015.98 Again, this apprehension data includes both interior and border arrests, thus it is
possible that even these decreases and increases have more to do with interior than with border
arrests. In any case, neither the downward nor the upward changes following TPS designation
and re-designation suggest any significant magnet effect.
All of these metrics—TPS registrations, inadmissibility determinations, and
apprehensions—demonstrate that the designation, re-designation, and multiple extensions of
TPS for Haitians did not act as a magnet. TPS registrations intentionally increased by 13,000
following the 2011 re-designation in coordination with DHS policy providing for the legal
admission of orphans and others.99 By 2017, the number of Haitian registrants declined to
1,000 fewer than the initial 2010 registration.100 With regards to those determined to be
inadmissible, the numbers started going down after the 2011 re-designation, and in FY 2014
and FY 2015, the number of inadmissible arrivals returned to pre-earthquake levels.101
Finally, the relative decreases and increases in the number of Haitians apprehended near the
border and in the interior starting in the year of designation and for the five years following,
including the year of re-designation, did not result in major changes.102 In short, the TPS
policies for Haitians did not have a magnet effect.
III. HOW TO ENSURE THAT TPS IS TEMPORARY
Congress authorized the temporary protection of individuals to prevent returning them to a
crisis in their home countries in unsafe conditions or when their return would exacerbate the
humanitarian problems in their home country.103 When designing TPS, Congress understood that
some conflicts may extend over many years.104 For this reason, Congress explicitly included a
requirement for temporariness in the cases of environmental disasters and “extraordinary and
OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2016 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 93 tbl.34 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016%20Yearbook%20of%20Immigration%20Statisti
cs.pdf.
99
See supra Table 2, p. 17, and notes 83–85.
100
See supra Table 2, p. 17.
101
See supra Chart 1, p. 20.
102
See supra Chart 2, p. 21.
103
The designation criteria for TPS set out in the statute focus on conditions that prevent the safe return of
nationals, such as conflict, and the substantial disruption of living conditions caused by disasters such that a
government is unable to handle returns. 8 U.S.C.A § 1254a(b)(1).
104
Congress focused particular attention, for example, on the civil war in El Salvador. As Sen. DeConcini
(D-AZ) stated on the Senate floor in late October 1990 as it considered the final conference report of the
Immigration Act of 1990, which included the TPS provisions: “Since 1979, continuous violence and civil
war has plagued tiny El Salvador, a country about the size of Massachusetts. Over that time, over 1 million,
or at least 20 percent, of the country’s 5 million inhabitants have been uprooted by conflicts as government
forces clash with those of the opposition.” 136 CONG. REC. 35,611 (1990). Due to the conflict and human
rights violations in El Salvador, Rep. Moakley (D-MA) started advocating for some type of safe haven
protection for Salvadorans in 1983, four years into the civil war. See Stay of Deportation for
Undocumented Salvadorans and Nicaraguans: Hearing on H.R. 618 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and Int’l Law. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 18-19 (1987). It took another
seven years of conflict and advocacy before Rep. Moakley achieved his goal: El Salvador was the only
country that Congress explicitly designated for TPS. Sec. 303 of P.L. 101-649, 104 STAT. 5035 (Nov. 29,
1990).
98
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temporary” conditions; it did not include this requirement in the case of armed conflicts. 105 Even
where it included this requirement, Congress did not provide a definition for “temporary.”
Congress simply authorized the Executive to grant TPS for six to eighteen months at a time.”106
As Table 3 below indicates, TPS at times only lasted for a few years. The most recent
examples of such truly “temporary” policies involve Guinea and Sierra Leone, which were
designated on November 21, 2014 because of an Ebola virus disease outbreak that began in
January 2014.107 This was the largest Ebola virus disease outbreak since the virus was
discovered.108 By the designation date, over 2,400 people had died and there were an additional
6,700 reported cases of Ebola. The DHS Secretary extended TPS once in May 2016 but then
announced in September 2016 that the Ebola virus had subsided and the conditions in Sierra Leone
and Guinea no longer supported the designation of TPS. The final six-month extension that lasted
until May 21, 2017 provided for an “orderly transition.”109 TPS also ended in less than four years
after initial designation for beneficiaries from Kuwait, Lebanon, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, Angola,
and Rwanda.

105

See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 244A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2012). For an indepth and illuminating discussion of the three types of TPS, see Benjamin M. Haldeman, Note,
Discretionary Relief and Generalized Violence in Central America: The Viability of Non-Traditional
Applications of Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, 15 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 185 (2016).
106
8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a(b)(2).
107
Designation of Guinea for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,511, 69,512 (Nov. 21, 2014);
Designation of Sierra Leone for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,506, 69,508 (Nov. 21, 2014).
108
Designation of Guinea for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,511, 69,512 (Nov. 21, 2014);
Designation of Sierra Leone for Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 69,506, 69,508 (Nov. 21, 2014).
109
While the DHS Secretary treated Liberia the same way as Sierra Leone and Guinea regarding the
Ebola virus outbreak, that country has had a complex and lengthy TPS history, dating back to its original
designation in 1991 following the outbreak of civil war. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (providing
Liberia’s numerous TPS notices). When TPS expired September 28, 1999, the Attorney General provided
DED for Liberians, which was extended to September 29, 2002. The Attorney General re-designated
Liberia for TPS, which lasted from October 1, 2002 until October 1, 2007. TPS termination was followed
by DED once again, which was ultimately extended through March 31, 2019 for Liberians here since
October 2002. JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RES. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS:
OVERVIEW AND CURRENT ISSUES 8−9 (2019).
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Table 3: Duration of TPS110
Designated
Nationality
Kuwait
Lebanon

3/27/1991
DED 3/28/1992
3/27/1991

Termination/Extension
Date
3/27/1992
DED 12/31/1993
4/9/1993

Duration of TPS
(nearest half year)
1 year
2 years of DED
2 years

Guinea

11/21/2014

5/21/2017

2.5 years

Guinea-Bissau

3/11/1999

9/10/2001

2.5 years

Kosovo Province

6/9/1998

12/8/2000

2.5 years

Angola

3/29/2000

3/29/2003

3 years

Rwanda

6/7/1994

12/6/1997

3.5 years

Nepal*

6/24/2015

Termination: 6/24/2019

4 years

Yemen**
Sierra Leone I
Sierra Leone II
Monserrat

9/3/2015
11/4/1997
11/21/2014
8/27/1997

Extension until: 3/3/2020
5/3/2004
5/21/2017
2/27/2005

4.5 years
6.5 years
2.5 years
7.5 years

Bosnia Hercegovina

South Sudan**

8/10/1992
3/27/1991
DED 9/29/1999
10/1/2002
DED 10/1/2007
11/21/2014
DED 5/21/2017
11/3/2011

2/10/2001
9/28/1999
DED 9/28/2002
10/1/2007
DED 11/21/2014
5/21/2017
3/31/2020
Extension until: 11/3/2020

8.5 years
8.5 years
3 years of DED
5 years
7 years of DED
2.5 years
3 years of DED
9 years

Syria**

3/29/2012

Extension until: 3/31/2021

9 years

Haiti*

1/ 21/2010

Termination: 7/22/2019

9.5 years

Burundi
El Salvador I
El Salvador II*
Nicaragua*

11/4/1997
11/29/1990
DED 7/1/1992
3/9/2001
1/5/1999

5/2/2008
6/30/1992
DED 12/31/1994
Termination: 3/9/2019
Termination: 1/5/2019

10.5 years
1.5 years
2.5 years of DED
18 years
20 years

Sudan*

11/4/1997

Termination: 11/2/2018

21 years

Honduras*

1/ 5/1999

Termination: 1/5/2020

21 years

Somalia**

9/16/1991

Extension until: 3/17/2020

28.5 years

Liberia I
Liberia II
Liberia III

Date TPS Begins

*In Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-01554-EMC (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California enjoined DHS from implementing and enforcing the decisions to terminate TPS for Sudan,
Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador, pending further resolution of the case. On April 11, 2019, in Saget v. Trump, No.
18-cv-01599 (E.D.N.Y.), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York also enjoined the termination
of TPS for Haiti, pending a final decision on the merits of the case. The terminations for Nepal and Honduras are
also on hold while Ramos is resolved. Bhattarai v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-731 (N.D. Cal).
**No pending expiration of TPS.

This Table was compiled from the following sources: Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (using the
TPS notices for each country); Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 18, 2019).
110
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A. Facilitating Voluntary Return When TPS is Temporary

If a crisis ends within a few years such that it is safe to return home, TPS can actually be
temporary. Numerous examples above, from Kuwait to Rwanda, demonstrate this. Ending the
policy does not necessarily mean that TPS beneficiaries with no other legal way of remaining in
the United States actually returned voluntarily. Congress did not establish any policies to
encourage voluntary return when this humanitarian program ends in a timely fashion. Without
such return incentives and evidence that repatriation occurs, critics of TPS are more easily able
to argue that the United States should not provide safe haven in the first place. 111 Accordingly,
the United States should develop practices to encourage beneficiaries to return to their home
countries in ways that will help them reintegrate.
Such voluntary return policies and practices constitute one of the critical functions that the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has played for millions of conflict
refugees around the globe.112 Observers have long recommended that the United States adopt
UNHCR strategies as ways to help TPS beneficiaries rebuild their lives in their home countries.
In the 1990s, for example, Bill Frelick and Barbara Kohnen, then experts at the U.S. Committee
for Refugees, advocated for the facilitation of voluntary return; they argued that “[f]or TPS to be
an effective form of temporary protection, the U.S. government should . . . encourage voluntary
repatriation and reintegration as part of a larger process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of
societies emerging from conflict situations.”113
Experts and legislators have proposed various methods to achieve what UNHCR aims for
when assisting refugees with repatriation. Sustainable return and reintegration are UNHCR’s
goals to create durable solutions such that returning refugees will not be displaced again and can
build “peaceful, productive and dignified lives.”114 To facilitate voluntary return, UNHCR’s
reintegration activities focus on infrastructural rehabilitation, promotion of the rule of law,
investments in basic needs, and livelihood strategies.115
1. Engaging UNHCR’s Assistance in Facilitating Voluntary Return of TPS Beneficiaries
In a hearing on TPS before the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1999, Rep.
Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-Tex.) suggested directly involving UNHCR to assist with
repatriation of refugees after the termination of a TPS designation. She also discussed
focusing the resources of the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) to
“support necessary small-scale infrastructure and development projects and… identify

111

See North, supra note 88, at 6–7.
See Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/voluntary-repatriation49c3646cfe.html.
113
Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 20, at 339.
114
UNHCR, Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy: UNHCR’s Role in Support of the Return and
Reintegration of Displaced Populations, Parts I and II, ¶¶ 1-10 (2008), https://www.unhcr.org/enus/partners/guides/4c2203309/policy-framework-implementation-strategy-unhcrs-role-support-returnreintegration.html.
115
Id. at Part VII, ¶¶ 56-63.
112
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local, [non-governmental] organizations capable of delivering services at the grassroots
level.”116
2. Investments in Rule of Law and Economic Development of Home Countries
Other experts have specifically proposed that the U.S. government proactively remedy the
conditions that prevent safe repatriation by investing in effective rule of law and development
programs in the countries of origin of TPS beneficiaries. As the Executive Director of the Center
for Migration Studies, Donald Kerwin, observes, the “[p]romotion of the rule of law in TPSdesignated states should be a top-tier priority since rule of law deficiencies drive substantial
numbers of residents of these nations, including unaccompanied children, into international
migration streams.”117 Along with other experts, he also recommends creating regional migration
agreements that use development and institution-building initiatives to encourage the return of
migrant groups.118
3. Creating Financial Incentives for TPS Beneficiaries to Return Voluntarily
In addition to establishing such programs that create safety and stability in the countries
of return, Congress should target individual TPS beneficiaries with financial incentives that
derive from their employment in the United States. For example, TPS beneficiaries pay Social
Security taxes as wage earners, yet those who work for less than ten years are generally not
eligible to collect Social Security retirement benefits.119 In 1998, this author, along with two
other researchers, recommended that Congress consider using such funds to incentivize
repatriation when the crisis resulting in TPS designation ended after a few years and TPS was
terminated.120 That recommendation remains viable—individuals who earned wages and made
Social Security contributions would receive a meaningful portion of those contributions once
they have safely returned to their home country. Congress should also authorize the use of the
employer contributions connected to these returnees’ Social Security accounts to target the
communities to which these former TPS beneficiaries return in an effort to ensure safety and
livelihood opportunities.
4. Data Reporting Requirements Associated with TPS Termination and U.S. AID’s Role in
Facilitating Return
The American Promise Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY),
proposed changes to the reporting requirements associated with the termination of TPS for a given

116

Designations of Temporary Protected Status and Fraud in Prior Amnesty Programs: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 86 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee).
117
Donald Kerwin, Creating a More Responsive and Seamless Refugee Protection System: The Scope,
Promise and Limitations of US Temporary Protection Programs, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 44, 64
(2014).
118
Id.; see Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic
Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 558−566 (1998).
119
See Benefits Planner: Social Security Credit, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
120
Martin et al., supra note 118, at 575.
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country.121 Her proposal recommends that the DHS Secretary analyze the home country’s
financial ability to provide for its repatriated citizens. The report would include the steps that the
country has taken to remedy the cause of its initial designation as well as an analysis of the
financial and social impacts of repatriation.122 This information would also help U.S. AID and
other agencies in establishing and implementing their own rule of law and economic development
programs to facilitate repatriation upon termination of TPS for any particular home country.
Congress should carefully consider and then adopt the best options to facilitate voluntary
repatriation when TPS ends in a reasonable period of time. By creating humanitarian return
policies for TPS beneficiaries, Congress can contribute to sustainable repatriation and reintegration
and ensure that TPS becomes a truly temporary status. By establishing such policies, Congress
will make it more likely that the United States can continue to provide this valuable protection to
those who cannot return safely to their countries during crises.
B. Making TPS Work When Conditions Preventing Safe Return Do Not Change in a Timely Way
As Table 3 shows, a good number of the designated nationalities have been eligible for
temporary protection for over ten years. In fact, Somalia’s TPS designation has been in place
since 1991 and will continue at least until 2020.123 Unfortunately, Congress did not create the
policy tools needed to deal with long-lasting situations that make it unsafe for nationals to
return home.
While Congress did not limit TPS in overall duration, the statute provides two
problematic ways to handle lengthy crises. One solution involves authorizing LPR status for
TPS beneficiaries. However, this solution requires a supermajority in the Senate.124 Since the
creation of TPS, sixty or more senators have never voted for such a measure. This effectively
means that the executive branch only has one workable option: to re-designate TPS indefinitely
as humanitarian crises become protracted. That is precisely what administrations have done.
As Table 3 shows, DHS has provided four nationalities with TPS for two decades or more.
These limited policy tools undermine the purpose of TPS to provide temporary safety to those
whose countries are in crisis.
C. A Humanitarian Solution for a Humanitarian Problem
At the human and social levels, these two solutions are problematic because during these
lengthy periods, children are born, school and work relationships are developed, businesses are
built, and families become integrated into communities. In economic terms, the longer that
TPS beneficiaries contribute to Social Security and Medicare, the more inequitable it becomes
to deny them core benefits in a society that they have been allowed to join.
In 1987, Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) proposed a bill to provide LPR status to Polish
EVD holders; her statement advocating for Polish EVD holders continues to be salient today:

121

American Promise Act of 2017, H.R. 4253, 115th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2017).
The American Promise Act defines “provide for its repatriated citizens” as “a country’s ability to
provide safety, and social safety net services, including preventive healthcare services, and housing.”
Id. § 2.
123
Extension of the Designation of Somalia for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,695, 43,696
(Aug. 27, 2018).
124
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h).
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Almost all of these [Poles] have been in the United States more than 5 years. Many
now have children that [sic] were born in the United States. Since coming to this
country, these Poles have been productive members of the American community.
They are committed to bettering the economic and social status of themselves or
[sic] their children. There is no future for them in Poland. Their only future is
here.125
Applying Sen. Mikulski’s criteria to TPS beneficiaries today reveals a human, social and
economic portrait similar to that of the Polish EVD holders she described. Nationals of the three
countries with the largest number of TPS beneficiaries currently in the United States (El Salvador,
Honduras, and Haiti) have established significant American ties over time.126 This group of
302,000 beneficiaries includes parents of 273,200 U.S. citizen children.127 More than twenty
percent of these TPS beneficiaries, some 68,000, were childhood arrivals.128 About thirty percent
of these households are homeowners.129 More than one half of the Salvadoran and Honduran TPS
beneficiaries have lived in the United States for twenty years or longer.130 These strong ties to the
United States underscore the problems with the current program. Congress intended TPS to
remain temporary, but it did not include viable alternatives when home country conditions
preclude the safe return of individuals benefiting from TPS.
Experts have recognized that TPS traps long-term beneficiaries in a legal limbo by making
it especially difficult to achieve a legislative path to a legal immigration status that reflects the
duration of their stay in the United States, such as LPR status.131 This problem occurs when DHS
determines that nationals cannot be returned to their home country in safety after several years
and there is no indication that the situation will change. Recognizing that the Senate
supermajority requirement is not a feasible way to address the situation of the many long-term
TPS beneficiaries, legislators and experts have proposed alternative durable solutions.132
Following the establishment of TPS, as discussed below, only once have legislators
provided even an indirect and somewhat arduous path to lawful permanent resident status for a
specific nationality that included some TPS beneficiaries--and even that path would not take
effect until several years after the end of TPS.133 While Congress enacted legislation not long
125

133 CONG. REC. 26,427, 26,499 (1987) (statement of Sen. Barbara Mikulski).
Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary
Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC.
577, 577−78, 581−82, 588 (2017).
127
Id. at 578.
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Id. at 577.
129
Id. at 581.
130
Id. at 578.
131
Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected Status after 25 Years: Addressing the Challenge of Long-Term
‘Temporary’ Residents and Strengthening a Centerpiece of US Humanitarian Protection, 2 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUMAN. SEC. 22, 29−31 (2014); see also Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 20, at 357−58.
132
Bergeron, supra note 131, at 35−37; see also Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Creating
Cohesive, Coherent Immigration Policy, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUMAN SEC. 180, 190 (2017).
133
See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203, 111
Stat. 2160, 2196-2200 (1997). In contrast with the direct path to lawful permanent resident status that
Congress created for Cubans and Nicaraguans in Section 202, Congress required Salvadorans, including
some who had TPS in the early 1990s, to apply for suspension of deportation. The latter is an indirect, more
difficult path to lawful permanent residence status that requires a showing of “extreme hardship.” See Mary
Giovagnoli, USING ALL THE TOOLS IN THE TOOLBOX: HOW PAST ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE USED
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before creating TPS that enabled nationalities with EVD to become lawful permanent residents,
proposals authorizing permanent immigration status for all TPS beneficiaries who have resided
in the United States for a set period of years have not yet been adopted by Congress. Such a
systemic statutory change would eliminate the requirement of a Senate supermajority to adjust
to LPR status and replace it with a way to end the temporary humanitarian program at the point
when home country conditions still prevent return and TPS beneficiaries have integrated into
U.S. society through work, family, education, and length of residence, among other factors.
D. Congressional Authorization of Durable Solutions for a Specific Nationality
In 1997, Congress decided that certain Central Americans who had fled the civil conflicts in
the last quarter of the twentieth century, including many denied asylum in the 1980s, should be
allowed in some cases to pursue a pathway to LPR status after spending many years in the United
States.134 The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA)
provided Nicaraguans with a direct pathway to LPR status but made Salvadorans and Guatemalans
apply for suspension of deportation.135 Those granted suspension of deportation after showing
extreme hardship and meeting other statutory requirements included some Salvadorans who had
been granted TPS in 1991 as directed by Congress until that program ended in June 1992.136
E. Congressional Enactment of a Durable Solution for Certain EVD Beneficiaries
While Congress has not enacted a general durable solution for TPS beneficiaries, it did so
for EVD beneficiaries as late as 1987. Congress enabled nationals of countries who had entered
the United States before July 21, 1984 and who were provided EVD before November 30, 1987
to apply for “temporary permanent resident” status and then adjust to lawful permanent resident
status after one year.137 This law allowed nationals from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Poland, and
Uganda to become LPRs.138 When introducing the legislation into the House of Representatives,
Rep. Chester Atkins (D-MA) lauded the bill’s provision of a durable solution, saying, “[w]ith this
bill, we are able to preserve for the United States a leadership role in resettling and giving safe
haven to refugees escaping persecution or certain death in their own country.”139

EXECUTIVE BRANCH AUTHORITY IN IMMIGRATION, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 3, 7–15 (2011),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Using_All_the_Tools__NACARA_090111.pdf.
134
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE NICARAGUAN ADJUSTMENT AND CENTRAL AMERICAN RELIEF ACT:
HARDSHIP RELIEF AND LONG-TERM ILLEGAL ALIENS 1, 6-7 (1998),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19980715_98-3_08ea932ffbb5b70b21888bb84863bfba90bfba25.pdf.
135
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-100, §§ 202-203,
111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2200 (1997).
136
See Deferral of Enforced Departure for Salvadorans, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,700, 28,701 (June 26, 1992).
137
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 902, 101
Stat. 1331, 1400−01 (1987).
138
Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 20, at 341–42, 357.
139
99 CONG. REC. 15,556, 64 (1987) (statement of Rep. Chester Atkins).
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F. Congressional Proposals of Durable Solutions for TPS Beneficiaries
To date, then, the only legislation that provided a durable solution for any TPS nationality
affected only one group, Salvadorans, back in 1997, five years after their TPS ended. No proposal
establishing a general durable solution has yet met with success.
Experts recognized the need for a durable solution, however, during the Congressional
discussions of a safe haven in the 1980’s. In a House of Representatives hearing on the original
TPS legislation, for example, Doris Meissner, the head of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service in the Clinton Administration, then a policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, suggested a rolling registry program which would allow TPS holders to gain
legal status if safe haven protection extended for a period of ten or fifteen years.140 Following
TPS enactment and after observing the inability of TPS to protect conflict refugees in protracted
situations, other experts suggested that Congress make long-term TPS beneficiaries eligible for
regular adjustment of LPR status or find other ways to provide a durable solution for those who
cannot return home in safety.141
During the Trump Administration in particular, legislators have introduced bills that would
establish various durable solutions.142 Member of Congress generally did so in response to the
Department of Homeland Security actions to end TPS for Sudan, El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua
in 2017 and 2018.143 Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee’s (D-TX) Save America Comprehensive
Immigration Act of 2017, for example, would grant legal permanent resident status to those who
have been in the United States continuously with TPS status for at least five years.144
The American Promise Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY), would
allow nationals of TPS-designated countries who were granted or eligible for TPS on or before
October 1, 2017 and who have been continuously in the country for three years to apply for
adjustment of status to legal permanent residence.145 In supporting the bill, Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA)
expressed concern about repatriating those protected for lengthy periods under TPS, including
many with U.S. citizen children:
I am deeply troubled that the President may remove protected legal status for
Salvadorans, Hondurans, Haitians and other TPS beneficiaries escaping conflict
and natural disasters in their home countries. The President would be forcing
families, many who have lived in the U.S. for nearly 20 years and have made
significant contributions to the U.S. economy, to leave the country or work here
unlawfully. Many of their children—nearly 275,000 of them—have known no other
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Temporary Safe Haven Hearing, supra note 46, at 36−37 (statement of Doris Meissner).
Bergeron, supra note 131, at 35−37; Kerwin, supra note 117, at 65−66.
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Yari Gutierrez, Temporary Protected Status: An Explainer, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/temporary-protected-status-tps-an-explainer/.
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See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10070, UPDATE: TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY
PROTECTED STATUS FOR SUDAN, NICARAGUA, HAITI, AND EL SALVADOR: KEY TAKEAWAYS AND
ANALYSIS (2018); see also WILSON, supra note 109.
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Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2017, H.R. 3647, 115th Cong. § 1301(a) (1st Sess.
2017).
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American Promise Act of 2017, H.R. 4253, 115th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2017).
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home than the United States. Deporting them is neither sensible nor
compassionate.146
In both 2017 and 2019, Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) along with several other senators
introduced the “Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency (SECURE)
Act,” which allows certain nationals of a TPS designated country who have been continuously in
the United States for at least three years to apply for lawful permanent resident status.147
Responding to the actions to try to terminate TPS for certain nationalities, Sen. Van Hollen said:
For decades, individuals living in the United States have been granted Temporary
Protected Status to stay here when their home countries have become too dangerous
to return to because of devastating natural disasters, ongoing civil war, or extreme
violence. . . . These men and women have lived here legally for years – they have
jobs and businesses and are our neighbors. We cannot in good faith send them back
to some of the most dangerous places in the world. The courts have made clear this
Administration’s decisions are unjust, and this legislation will take permanent
action to give these families certainty and security.148
Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) added: “President Trump’s decision to end TPS for Honduras,
Haiti, El Salvador and other countries—as well as ending DED for Liberia—will needlessly rip
families apart. We cannot let that happen.”149
G. Durable Solutions for Those with Humanitarian Protection in Other Common Law Countries
In considering such legislative proposals, Congress should also look to other common law
countries that permit those with humanitarian protection to settle as lawful residents. After five
years of humanitarian protection (limited leave), those provided humanitarian protection in Great
Britain, for example, are eligible to apply to settle indefinitely.150 Once settled (indefinite leave to
remain), such individuals are on a path to citizenship.151 Both Canada and Australia also allow
individuals with similar temporary humanitarian protection to become permanent residents and
ultimately citizens.152
146

Press Release, Nydia M. Velázquez, U.S. Congresswoman, Key Members of Congress Move to
Preserve TPS, Protect Immigrants (Nov. 3, 2017), https://velazquez.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/key-members-congress-move-preserve-tps-protect-immigrants.
147
Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency (SECURE) Act, S. 2144, 115th
Cong. § 2(b) (1st Sess. 2017); Safe Environment from Countries Under Repression and Emergency
(SECURE) Act, S. 879, 115th Cong., § 2(b) (1st Sess. 2019).
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Press Release, Christopher Van Hollen, U.S. Senator, Van Hollen, Cardin, Feinstein, Kaine Introduce
Legislation to Protect TPS Recipients (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/van-hollen-cardin-feinstein-kaine-introduce-legislation-to-protect-tps-recipients.
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Id.
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U.K. HOME OFFICE, HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION VERSION 5.0 22 (5th rev. 2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/597377/
Humanita rian-protection-v5_0.pdf.
151
Apply for Citizenship if You Have Indefinite Leave to Remain or ‘Settled Status,’ GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/apply-citizenship-indefinite-leave-to-remain (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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See Application for Permanent Residence in Canada—Protected Persons and Convention Refugees,
GOV’T OF CAN. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
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As the above analysis indicates, Congress should find ways appropriate to the
humanitarian nature of TPS to keep it temporary. That requires two significant types of reforms.
First, Congress should authorize programs that encourage voluntary repatriation when a crisis
ends in a reasonable period of time. Such programs will ensure both that TPS for such
nationalities is temporary and that TPS beneficiaries return in a safe and dignified way during
that temporary period. Second, Congress should provide a durable solution for conflict refugees
and others when the crisis is prolonged. That will also keep TPS temporary and ensure that those
who have integrated into American communities are provided a lasting solution to their
displacement.
IV. HOW TPS CAN HANDLE ARRIVALS FROM AN ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
The issue of handling humanitarian arrivals during an on-going crisis arose early on in the
development of the original TPS legislation. Initially, precursor bills offering temporary safe
haven to Salvadorans did not contain entry cut-off dates.153 However, hearings on these bills
revealed the opposition’s strong conviction that an entry cut-off date needed to be put in place to
combat the perceived magnet effect of any TPS policy.154 In response to these concerns by
opponents, Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) expressed the view that entry cut-off dates are unlikely
to eliminate Salvadorans fleeing to the United States because they will continue to seek safety as
long as there are dangerous conditions in their country.155 However, the fear of a magnet effect
prevailed and ultimately eliminated the possibility that the original temporary safe haven
legislation could deal with ongoing flows of people fleeing civil wars or natural disasters.
A second aspect of TPS also seriously limits the policy from covering those who flee an
ongoing crisis. The group-based designation system created by Congress only covers those
nationalities where the Secretary of Homeland Security decides to exercise his or her discretion.
Some countries experiencing civil conflict, such as Colombia, have never been designated. While
the group designation mechanism potentially offers a speedy way to provide temporary safe
haven, TPS has been criticized by experts for gaps in protection for similarly situated
nationalities.156
In contrast with the very limited form of temporary protection provided to nationals who
happen to be in the United States when the DHS Secretary selects a group for TPS, Western
European countries have provided a form of temporary protection to civil war refugees and
citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/application-permanent-residence-canadaprotected-persons-convention-refugees.html; Apply for Citizenship: Who Can Apply, GOV’T OF CAN. (July
3, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/canadiancitizenship/become-canadian-citizen/eligibility.html; Become an Australian Citizen (by Conferral)
Permanent Residents or New Zealand Citizens, AUSTRALIAN GOV'T: DEP’T OF HOME AFFAIRS (last updated
Sept. 27, 2019), https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/citizenship/become-a-citizen/permanent-resident;
Protection Visas (Onshore), AUSTRALIAN GOV'T: DEP’T OF HOME AFFAIRS,
https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/what-we-do/refugee-and-humanitarian-program/onshore-protection.
153
See, e.g., H.R. 4447, 98th Cong. (1983).
154
See Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the
Subcomm. On Immigr., Refugees, and Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 59 (1984).
155
See id. at 60.
156
Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It 2 (forthcoming 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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others fleeing an ongoing humanitarian emergency in any nation.157 The United Kingdom, for
example, provides “humanitarian protection” to those who are at a real risk of serious harm,
including in situations of general or indiscriminate violence.158 EU policies and state member
practice address large groups entering EU States during an emergency159 as well as individuals
seeking protection. For many member states, the latter occurs during individual asylum
determinations.160 In those cases, officials decide whether an individual has a well-founded fear
of persecution or is a refugee from conflict or other serious harm.161 Differentiating this form of
protection from asylum for persecuted refugees derived from the Refugee Convention, the EU
calls this “subsidiary” or “complementary” protection.162
A. Managing Humanitarian Arrivals Through Individual and Group Determinations
To fully ensure that TPS provides protection to those fleeing serious ongoing violence or
disruption, Congress should incorporate TPS into the individualized asylum process, as many
developed democratic states have done.163 DHS Asylum Officers already conduct interviews
with those seeking protection from persecution and make asylum decisions. In those same
interviews and with great efficiency, Asylum Officers could determine whether or not such
individuals qualify for TPS if they do not qualify for asylum.164
Incorporating TPS into the individualized asylum system is not the only tool that the
government should have to address such humanitarian cases. There is still an important role that
group-TPS can play for the United States. If Congress adopts this recommendation to incorporate
TPS into the individualized asylum system, then group-TPS can be used to respond to migration
emergencies that would overwhelm the individual asylum adjudication system.165 When a large
number of people from three Central American countries seeking safety in recent years arrived in
the United States, DHS funneled applications for protection through the asylum system, creating
significant caseloads that could not be handled in a timely fashion.166 That did not have to be the
157

See Jane McAdam, The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary
Protection Regime, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 462−66 (2005) (discussing the role of the European
Union Qualification Directive in codifying subsidiary protection which was an existing state practice used
to grant protection on an individual basis to those who are in need, but who fall outside the protection
regime of refugee law).
158
U.K. HOME OFFICE, supra note 150, at 12−15.
159
In 2001, the Council of the European Union directive created a procedure on temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons who could not safely return to their home country. Karoline
Kerber, The Temporary Protection Directive, 4 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 193 (2002).
160
Helene Lambert, The Next Frontier: Expanding Protection in Europe for Victims of Armed Conflict and
Indiscriminate Violence, 25 INTL J. REF. L. 207, 210 (2013).
161
Id.
162
Belen Olmos Giupponi, EU Return Policy and International Human Rights Law: Keeping the Balance
between Border Security and Human Dignity, 18 SPANISH YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 163, 164 (2013-2014).
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See Martin et al., supra note 118, at 569−70; see also Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 20, at 355
(calling for a mandatory prohibition on return for conflict refugees, similar to nonrefoulement or
withholding of removal for persecuted refugees).
164
Bill Frelick, Director of Human Rights Watch’s Refuge Rights Program, also recommends that such
“complementary” protection be provided on a regular basis through the individualized asylum system.
Frelick, supra note 156, at 8.
165
Frelick also recommends this use of group TPS upon the arrival of sufficiently large numbers. Id. at 10.
166
DHS placed asylum seekers in expedited removal, found that most Salvadorans, Hondurans and
Guatemalans demonstrated a credible fear of persecution, and placed them in removal proceedings before
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case. If the government had this dual system in place, it could have designated group-TPS for the
three Central American nationalities and directed those individuals to apply for group-TPS
protection. For those who then applied for asylum, the government could have held off making
any individualized asylum determination until either the asylum caseload allowed DHS to turn to
those applications or once TPS was winding down. That would have allowed the government to
manage the regular caseload of individual asylum seekers fleeing persecution. Moreover, the
government could have developed a regional approach to the emergency with other safe countries
in the Americas in connection with the group TPS designations.167
B. Improving TPS as Part of Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Like the United Kingdom and the EU, the United States should provide temporary protection
to all those who need safety from conflict, other serious violence, or major upheaval. The analysis
above demonstrates that TPS policies have not resulted in the imagined magnet effect. If, however,
policymakers are still not ready to improve TPS as recommended above, they should do so as part
comprehensive immigration reform, which will include effective ways to address unauthorized
immigration.
At the time that Congress enacted TPS, the United States did not have effective controls of
unauthorized cross-border movements or work—some 3.5 million unauthorized then resided in
the country.168 As of 2017, there were some 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United
States, down from a peak of 12.2 million in 2007.169 Registered TPS beneficiaries number over
300,000 from ten countries today,170 including more than 180,000 who have been issued valid
employment authorization documents by USCIS.171 More than 400,000 individuals from those
countries acquired TPS status at some point during the last three decades, including over 58,000
who became lawful permanent residents.172
Even though the TPS population is small when compared to the unauthorized population,
some lawmakers are not willing to enact the reforms recommended here to improve TPS before
the government controls unauthorized immigration in a meaningful way.173 For many years,
Congress has funded tremendous capacity at and between ports of entry to control unlawful
immigration judges. In FY 2013, fewer than 24,000 so-called “defensive” asylum claims were filed in
immigration courts. More than 122,000 such claims were filed in FY 2017, and that record is well on track
to be broken in FY 2019. See Adjudication Statistics: Defensive Asylum Applications, EXEC. OFF. FOR
IMMIGR. REV., DEP’T OF JUST. (July 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1106356/download.
167
See Martin et al., supra note 118, at 556–59.
168
That was just four years following the first and to date only major legalization program enacted by
Congress. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to
2000, OFF. OF POL’Y & PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV. 8,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20Immigrant%20Population%20Estima
tes%20in%20the%20US%201990%20to%202000.pdf.
169
Hispanic Trends: Unauthorized Immigrant Population Trends for States, Birth countries and Regions,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/unauthorized-trends/.
170
WILSON, supra note 109, at 5.
171
USCIS, supra note 89, at 13.
172
Id. at 12 n.7. Those 58,000 TPS beneficiaries who became lawful permanent residents do not need a
separate employment authorization document to work. Id.
173
See Indra Ekmanis, This Sweeping Immigration Bill Won’t Pass, but It’s Still A ‘Major Win,’ PRI’S THE
WORLD (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-03-21/sweeping-immigration-bill-won-t-pass-its-still-major-win.
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entry.174 It has been politically easy for Congress to fund border control with very significant
resources: “[s]ince 1993, when the current strategy of concentrated border enforcement was first
rolled out along the U.S.-Mexico border, the annual budget of the U.S. Border Patrol has increased
more than ten-fold, from $363 million to more than $4.7 billion.”175 Experts have analyzed the
major strategies to control the unlawful entry of those mainly seeking a better economic life and
found considerable successes with respect to this population,176 which until 2014 constituted the
vast majority of those entering unlawfully across the southern border with Mexico.177 One of the
leading analysts, Edward Alden, argues that border enforcement has been a significant reason for
the substantial decline in unauthorized migration across the southern border, with successful illegal
entries falling from roughly 1.8 million in 2000 to just 200,000 by 2015.178 In fact, border
enforcement has been so successful that since 2007, the majority of newly added unauthorized
immigrants arrived with legal visas and overstayed; in 2014, two-thirds of those who joined the
unauthorized population did so by remaining in the United States after their lawful permission to
stay expired.179
Unauthorized immigration cannot be controlled without addressing the major reason many
immigrants overstay their visas or cross the border without permission—the opportunity to work
for an American business.180 Congress knows how to establish a system that will control access to
174

The agency responsible for border control, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), consistently received
significantly more funding than the agency responsible for the interior enforcement of the immigration laws
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE) and the Department of Justice adjudicators at the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). See Stronger Border Security: 2019 Budget Fact Sheet,
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/FY19-Budget-FactSheet_Border-Security.pdf.
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https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_cost_of_immigration_enforce
ment_and_border_security.pdf.
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See Edward Alden, Is Border Enforcement Effective? What We Know and What It Means, 5 J.
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 481, 489–90 (2017). In addition to providing an excellent analysis of these
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Id. at 487-88. Alden carefully explains that these border deterrence strategies are not as effective with
respect to asylum seekers fleeing violence from the Northern Triangle countries and those with family ties
in the United States.
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Id. at 481. Moreover, he points out that in 2014, two-thirds of those added to the unauthorized
population arrived with legal visas and overstayed. As I suggest in this subpart, the most effective strategy
to deter those who overstay their visas mainly to improve their economic lives is through worksite
enforcement. Id. at 487–88.
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Id. at 482, 488; Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since
2007 Visa Overstays Have Outnumbered Undocumented Border Crossers by a Half Million, 5 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 124–25 (2017).
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Of an estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants, about 8 million worked in the United States as of
2014. “Unauthorized immigrants make up a larger share of the U.S. labor force (5% in 2014) than of the
total population (3.5%) in part because they are disproportionately likely to be of working age. Fully 92%
of unauthorized immigrants are ages 18 to 64, compared with 60% of the U.S.-born population and 76% of
lawful immigrants.” Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce
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Database to Verify Hires, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013),
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the workplace so that only those with authorization to work will be able to do so—the Senate
passed a bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2013 that included an effective
worksite verification system to do just that, while providing sufficient worker visas to meet U.S.
employer needs.181
Once access to the workplace is effectively controlled, DHS will be able to assure Congress
that policies to protect refugees fleeing an ongoing conflict and forced migrants who cannot return
to a country devastated by a natural disaster can be temporary. When the conflict ends in a
reasonable period of time, for example, DHS control over access to the workplace would limit the
ability of those foreign nationals who no longer need temporary protection to support themselves
through work—their work authorization would end, depriving them of access to jobs. Since the
analysis above in Part II shows that TPS policies have not resulted in a significant magnet effect,
Congress should change the law now to ensure that those fleeing ongoing humanitarian
emergencies receive protection in the United States. But in the very least, when Congress decides
to address unauthorized immigration by controlling the workplace and establishes an effective
system that meets the needs of employers with legal workers, lawmakers should adopt the
recommendations proposed here to protect all those who flee conflict or need protection from other
unsafe conditions in their home countries.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception in 1990, TPS has provided a safe haven for more than 400,000 individuals
from over twenty-two countries around the globe. However, the policy needs to be reformed to
ensure that TPS serves all those who need and deserve a temporary measure of protection.
When a conflict or humanitarian crisis ends in a reasonable period of time, the United States
should not only terminate TPS for that country but should also encourage and facilitate voluntary
repatriation. UNHCR commonly provides financial incentives to help displaced people restart their
lives back home and reintegrate after conflict has ended. The United States should implement a
similar practice by giving back Social Security withholdings to TPS workers who return home
during the termination period.
TPS is not the appropriate policy to provide long-term safe haven in protracted situations.
Over time, people put down strong roots in their communities through work, family, education,
and religious institutions. The United States should transition temporary protection to a permanent
status for individuals who cannot return home safely because of prolonged and significant
violence, upheaval, or instability.
Moreover, justice demands that similarly situated refugees from conflict, or other serious
violence and disruption, be treated alike. Due to concerns that TPS would attract large numbers of
new arrivals, Congress limited TPS to those already in the United States when a country is
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/bill-to-expand-us-database-to-verify-hires.html.
181
S. 744, Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, 113th Congress,
Title III, Subtitle A, Employment Verification System (2013). S. 744 was “a broad-based proposal for
reforming the U.S. immigration system written by a bipartisan group of eight senators known as the ‘Gang
of Eight,’” consisting of Sens. Schumer (D-NY), McCain (R-AZ), Durbin (D-IL), Graham (R-SC),
Menendez (D-NJ), Rubio (R-FL), Bennet (D-CO), and Flake (R-AZ); A Guide to S. 744: Understanding
the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 10, 2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-s744-understanding-2013-senateimmigration-bill.
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designated by the Executive branch. Almost thirty years, twenty-six designations covering twentytwo nationalities, twenty re-designations of eleven nationalities, and one hundred twenty-two
separate extensions later, no discernable magnet effect has occurred, as the above analysis
demonstrates.182 The United States can and should provide temporary protection to all those who
flee ongoing upheaval, not just to those who happen to be on this side of the border at the right
time. That line is too arbitrary when dealing with humanitarian crises.
Finally, as the major power in the Americas, the United States should find significant ways
to address the root causes of humanitarian flight in the region. Most people in the world stay in
their home countries unless conflict or other serious violence prevents them from doing so.183 It is
in the national interest of the United States to help weak governments develop the capacity to
protect their own citizens through rule of law programs and thus promote stability in the region.
In addition, the United States should work with regional neighbors who also provide safe haven to
those fleeing serious violence to ensure that all states in the region play meaningful protection
roles.184
Policymakers now have three decades of experience and evidence regarding the benefits and
shortcomings of TPS. The feared magnet effect has not happened. Accordingly, Congress should
ensure that this important form of humanitarian protection live up to its name and serve as a
temporary measure. Lawmakers should reform TPS so that it protects all those who need safe
haven and transitions individuals who cannot return home safely after a reasonable period of time
from temporary protection to a permanent status. When these reforms are in place, TPS will
achieve its full potential as a robust humanitarian instrument that can protect all those who have a
well-founded fear of death.

See Table 3: Duration of TPS Table, supra p. 24; Temporary Protected Status, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (TPS notices for each
country); Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & SERVS. (Sept. 1, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Nov. 18, 2019) (information
available under “Countries Currently Designated for TPS” and “Countries Previously Designated for
TPS”).
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According to the UN Population Division, international migrants comprised about 3.4% of the world’s
population in 2017, and refugees and asylum seekers made up only 10% of those international migrants.
As of 2017, then, 99.6% of the world’s population did not cross a border to seek safety in another country.
Population Facts: The World Counted 258 Million International Migrants in 2017, Representing 3.4% of
Global Population, No. 2017/5, U.N. DEP’T OF SOC. AND ECON. AFF., POPULATION DIVISION 1, 3 (Dec.
2017), https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/popfacts/PopFacts_20175.pdf.
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In the immediate region, the humanitarian crises in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala have
resulted in significant arrivals in neighboring countries, including Costa Rica, Belize, Mexico and
Panama, since 2014. As of mid-2018, UNHCR reports more than a 50% one-year increase in flight,
including entire families, as well as very significant internal displacement in Honduras and El Salvador.
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), OPERATIONAL UPDATE: NORTH OF CENTRAL AMERICA
SITUATION 1, 15 (2018), http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/NCA%20Situation%20%20Operational%20update%20-%20Mid-Year%202018.pdf.
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